

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

**MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD****SUBJECT: On-Site Inspection Study**

(S) Thank you for your letter of February 2, 1983 requesting that Bill Casey and I undertake a study which would review on-site inspection (OSI) in the context of START verification and compliance, and indicating your interest in the specific military, intelligence, legal and security ramifications of OSI.

(S) I believe that the points you raise are extremely important and must be studied very carefully before we develop our position on OSI. In this regard, we formed an interagency Consolidated Verification Group (CVG) last November to address the broad range of verification and compliance issues directed by National Security Decision Directive 53.

(S) The CVG, which is co-chaired by DoD and State and includes participation by the Intelligence Community, is currently studying the verification requirements of both START and INF. OSI forms a major part of this study, and the impact of OSI on sensitive U.S. facilities and the legal implications of OSI at private facilities are a key part of the CVG work. We also are in the process of studying the modalities of OSI. I expect that in about two months all of this work will have progressed to a point where some meaningful conclusions could be drawn. At that time, our staffs will arrange a briefing of the on-going work for the PFIAB. We would be happy to receive your comments on the CVG work and your suggestions on additional areas which may require detailed study.

(S) I share your view that, on balance, the United States might gain more than it will lose by opening up both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to OSI. In fact, we are already proceeding in this direction. The U.S. has proposed to the Soviet Union initiation of negotiations next month on verification improvements to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and we are waiting for

OSD review completed.

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their reply. Our goal is to seek Soviet agreement on direct yield measurement of all nuclear tests over 75 kilotons by an OSI team. This would open up U.S. and Soviet nuclear test sites to the other party. Whether we will be able to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on this initiative should give an indication of how forthcoming the Soviets might be on implementation of OSI.

(U) Thank you for your ideas. As always, we value your thoughts, especially on so complex an issue. We appreciate the interest PFIAB has in this important area of arms control, and look forward to working with you.